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Abstract 
 
Many debates in philosophy focus on whether folk or scientific psychological notions 
pick out cognitive natural kinds. Examples include memory, emotions and concepts. A 
potentially interesting type of kind is: kinds of mental representations (as opposed, for 
example, to kinds of psychological faculties). In this chapter we outline a proposal for 
a theory of representational kinds in cognitive science. We argue that the explanatory 
role of representational kinds in scientific theories, in conjunction with a mainstream 
approach to explanation in cognitive science, suggest that representational kinds are 
multi-level. This is to say that representational kinds’ properties cluster at different 
levels of explanation and allow for intra- and inter-level projections. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Cognitive scientists seek to explain psychological capacities and often appeal to mental 
representations in doing so. However, not all representations are equally useful to 
cognitive science, and only some cluster together to form kinds and “carve cognition at 
its joints”. What makes some representational categories natural representational 
kinds in cognitive science? This is the question we explore in this chapter.  
 
Some examples of candidate representational kinds within cognitive science include: 
essentialist representations, prototype representations, exemplar representations, 
object-files, mental maps, analog magnitude representations, action representations, 
structural geon-based object representations, visual working memory representations, 
quasi-pictorial representations, face representations in the FFA (face fusiform area), 
mental models, body schema representations, singular terms in the language of 
thought, bug representations in the frog’s brain, dominance hierarchy representations 
in baboons, naïve theories, core cognition representations, syntactic tree 
representations, Universal Grammar, content (or address-) addressable 
representations in memory, edge representations, etc. The status of each of these 
categories as a genuine representational kind is controversial. Some will strike the 
reader as more plausible or as better examples of representational kinds than others. 
We don’t wish to take a firm stand on any case listed above in particular, but merely 
appeal to them in order to help fix the reference of what we mean by “representational 
kind” within the context of cognitive science. 
 
The issue that interests us is not what a representation is, nor whether the notion of 
“mental representation” in cognitive science itself picks out a natural kind (Ramsey, 
2007; Shea, 2018). Rather, assuming there are mental representations, we are 
interested in what it is for a particular class of them to form a natural kind (we will 
often refer simply to “representational kinds”, implying that they are natural or real).  
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We are also not interested in entering into debates about whether folk psychological 
concepts (such as belief) aim at or succeed in picking out natural kinds (Jackson & 
Pettit, 1990; Lycan, 1988). Nor are we concerned with kinds of representations that are 
not mental (for instance, kinds of external representational artifacts, such as 
photographs). Our concern is with the notion of representation as it figures in cognitive 
science.  
 
This question must also be distinguished from the question of what in general 
constitutes a kind in cognitive science. There are presumably many varieties of kinds 
within cognitive science, some of which are not representational. For example, 
“innateness” has been argued to be a cognitive natural kind (Khalidi, 2016). While 
there is a class of innate representations, there might also be innate cognitive 
structures, processes, or mechanisms that are not representational in nature.1  
 
There are two parts to the notion of a “representational kind”. First, its members must 
be mental representations. Second, they must form a kind. We argue that reflection on 
these two components of the notion, together with certain widely shared assumptions 
within cognitive science, lead to our central thesis: representational kinds are multi-
level.  
 
The chapter will unfold as follows. In section 2 we introduce a contrast between a non-
natural representational category and a natural representational kind, and argue that 
the difference between them has to do with a contrast in their respective explanatory 
depths. In section 3, we outline a notion of non-classical natural kindhood which can 
be applied to representations. In section 4 we flesh out the multi-level proposal and 
the relevant notion of “depth” by appealing to the nature of mental representations and 
their role in multi-level explanations. In section 5 we refine the multi-level thesis. In 
section 6 we reply to objections.  
 
2. A contrast case 
 
A first way to get at the notion of “representational kind” is by noting an intuitive 
contrast between two exemplary categories of representations: the class of wombat-
representations, on the one hand, and the class of action-representations, on the other 
(Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi, & Rizzolatti, 2002).  
 
The two classes have much in common. Both are characterized by the domain of 
entities in the world which they represent: wombat-representations refer to the 
domain of wombats, while action-representations refer to the broader domain of 
actions performed by living beings. Thus, both classes are clearly characterized 
semantically, or by their intentional content. 
 
Based on this, one might hold that there are necessary and sufficient conditions for 
membership in each class. An entity is a wombat-representation just in case it correctly 
applies to all and only wombats. Similarly, an entity is an action-representation just in 
case it correctly applies to all and only (visible) actions. Yet the former is not a good 
candidate for representational kindhood, while the latter is. The study of wombat-
                                                   
1 Note that it wouldn’t follow merely from the fact that “innate” is a cognitive kind, that “innate 
representation” is a representational kind, even if it turns out that “representation” is also a cognitive 
kind. 
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representations is of little interest to cognitive science. Intuitively, such a class is not 
likely to correspond to a joint in (cognitive) nature, and so is not a worthwhile target 
of cognitive scientific inquiry. By contrast, there is a dynamic and successful research 
program centered around the investigation of action-representations. What 
distinguishes the two cases? 
 
A natural reaction might be that the difference lies entirely in the domains that each 
class of representations targets, as opposed to something about the representations 
themselves. Actions are a very general category of things, which are of evolutionary and 
psychological significance to humans and other animals. By contrast, wombats are an 
idiosyncratic domain, which is unlikely to be of much interest (unless you’re an 
ethologist specialized in wombats).  
 
This is obviously true, but it misses the point. There are other very general and 
significant domains, such as food2 (Lafraire, Rioux, Giboreau, & Picard, 2016), or 
supernatural entities3 (Atran, 2002), of which humans undoubtedly form 
representations. Yet upon investigation, these classes of representations do not appear, 
by cognitive scientists’ lights, to correspond to natural representational kinds (Atran, 
2002; Shutts, Condry, Santos, & Spelke, 2009). Members of these classes lack a 
sufficient degree of unity with respect to their representational properties, even if they 
are domain-specific.  
 
Moreover, not all representational kinds are characterized by their specific target 
domains. Many plausible candidates for representational kindhood range across 
multiple referential domains (e.g. essentialist representations). Other plausible 
candidate representational kinds might not be characterized by the domain of things 
they represent, but rather in terms of other properties, such as their format (e.g. analog 
representations). And there are debates about whether representations of the very 
same domain constitute a representational kind, e.g. whether the different bodies of 
information that pick out the same category form a representational kind, 
corresponding to “the concept” of that category (Machery, 2009). 
 
Consider an analogy. Dust and gold differ both in their significance for humans, and 
with respect to their natural kindhood. However, what makes it the case that dust is 
                                                   
2 While food is an important category for human survival, we need to distinguish a category of 
representations, from the category they represent. In order for food representations to form a kind, it is 
not enough for food to be an interesting and important category; we would need to find properties that 
representations of food share qua representations. Yet food representations lack unity, from a cognitive 
perspective. For instance, young infants do not seem to possess a dedicated learning mechanism for food 
items (while they possess dedicated learning mechanisms for tracking agents and small quantities, for 
instance), and adults distinguish between edible and inedible items via a motley collection of domain-
general mechanisms, which include texture, color, and smell (Shutts et al., 2009).  
 
3 Beliefs about supernatural beings are similar to food representations. According to Atran (2002), there 
is no special cognitive system for thinking about religion or representing supernatural beings. Religious 
beliefs are instead underpinned by “a variety of cognitive and affective systems, some with separate 
evolutionary histories, and some with no evolutionary history to speak of. Of those with an evolutionary 
history, some parts plausibly have an adaptive story, while others are more likely by-products.” (Atran, 
2002, p. 265). Religious beliefs are not a natural kind, and representations of supernatural entities are 
not kinds either, but are distributed across different systems, have different formats, and different 
evolutionary histories (p. 113).  
 
4 
 
not a natural kind has little to do with its lack of significance: what prevents dust from 
being a natural kind is simply that what instances of dust have in common that makes 
them dust is something entirely superficial. Dust is a nominal kind. Whatever appears 
dusty, or whatever we are disposed to categorize as dust (at least in normal 
circumstances) just is dust. There can be fool’s gold – stuff that seems like it is gold but 
turns out not to be upon further investigation. Yet there cannot be “fool’s dust”, nor 
“shmust” on Twin Earth (Dennett, 1994). This is because dust has no underlying 
nature, or essence. In turn, there is no science of dust as such. 
 
The intuition we hope to elicit, and build upon in what follows, is that wombat 
representations are to action-representations what dust is to gold. The class of 
wombat-representations is superficial, whereas there is something deeper that action-
representations have in common, and which makes them fruitful targets for cognitive 
scientific inquiry. As we see it, the important difference is that the only thing that 
wombat-representations have in common is their intentional or semantic content. 
Wombat-representations may constitute an intentional (or semantic) category. But 
intentional categories are not necessarily representational kinds, which are those that 
matter from the perspective of cognitive science. 
 
Action-representations’ status as a representational kind depends on its being possible 
to discover other sorts of properties that this particular class of representations, which 
we initially characterized merely in terms of their target domain, non-accidentally 
share. First, there are specific psychological effects associated with the category. For 
instance, in the apparent body motion paradigm, when people observe a hand action 
moving across the body, they perceive the longer but anatomically plausible path, 
rather than the shorter but anatomically implausible path (Shiffrar, 2008). Also, action 
representations are stored separately in visual working memory from colors, locations, 
and shapes, as evidenced by action-specific memory capacity limits (Wood, 2007). 
Furthermore, the category exhibits unity at the neural level. Action-representations 
seem to be reusing the same neural mechanisms that are used for action production 
(Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2007). We can study their neural correlates, as they elicit 
activations in the superior temporal sulcus (STS) and in the premotor cortex area F5 
(Jellema & Perrett, 2007). 
 
Note that several of the interesting, unobvious properties of action-representations are 
possessed not merely in virtue of what the representations are about. None of the 
aforementioned properties of action-representations can be discovered by reflecting 
on their content (or by considering properties directly related to their content, such as 
entailment-patterns). In our view, this hints towards a central aspect of 
representational kinds: representational kinds in cognitive science are inherently 
multi-level. This connects to one of the central features of explanations in cognitive 
science: merely intentional categories belong to horizontal explanations, while 
representational kinds belong to vertical explanations, and figure in the functional 
decomposition of a capacity (Cummins, 1983). This is what lends certain classes of 
representations the “depth” which enables them to constitute genuine kinds, despite 
the fact that – by contrast with gold – representations plausibly lack classical essences. 
We will discuss multi-levelness in section 4, but first, in order to set the stage for this 
view of representational kinds, we need to say some more about the non-classical view 
of natural kinds that it presupposes.  
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3. Non-classical kindhood 
 
Our aim is not to enter into debates on natural kinds in general outside of cognitive 
science, nor it is to defend a particular view. It is rather to sketch an independently 
plausible, broader approach to natural kinds that is compatible with our specific 
proposal for representational kinds.  
 
Natural kinds figure in scientific explanations – traditionally, natural kinds are taken 
to be the categories which feature in natural laws – and in scientific predictions and 
investigations. It is often said that natural kinds are “inductively deep” (Carey, 2009; 
Quine, 1969). This means that a natural kind supports projection: there are numerous 
true, non-obvious generalizations that can be made about its members, which share 
scientifically interesting properties because there is an underlying factor that they have 
in common, rather than by accident. According to the classical account of natural kinds 
(Kripke, 1980; Putnam, 1975), this underlying factor is an essential property, which 
also provides necessary and sufficient conditions for kind membership, in addition to 
causing members to exhibit a shared syndrome of properties – a cluster of generally 
more superficial features that kind-members tend to exhibit on average.   
 
Syndrome properties are epistemically useful in initial identifications of potential 
members. They may even be practically indispensable: one typically postulates a kind 
prior to grasping its essence, which is psychologically represented only by a 
“placeholder” (Gelman, 2004). Yet from a metaphysical perspective, syndromes are 
only contingently related to kind-membership. A member of a kind may fail to satisfy 
its syndrome to any significant degree, while a non-member may satisfy it perfectly. 
Ordinary users of kind-concepts tacitly know this, as shown by research on 
“psychological essentialism” (Gelman, 2004). 
 
Kind-membership depends on possession of the potentially hidden essence, rather 
than superficial resemblance. So shared kindhood is inferable from shared essence 
even in the absence of superficial resemblance. In turn, knowledge that superficially 
dissimilar entities are of a kind enables one to justifiably expect them to bear some 
deeper commonalities than otherwise evident – which enables kind-concepts to play a 
major heuristic role in guiding scientific inquiry. 
 
One well-known problem with the classical account of kinds is that it fails to apply to 
special sciences, such as psychology (Dupre, 1981; Fodor, 1974; Millikan, 1999). For 
instance, it seems implausible that there is a classical essence that all and only action-
representations share. If all kinds were classical, there would presumably be no 
representational kinds in cognitive science whatsoever.4 
 
Note that this is true even if membership in the category can be defined strictly, by 
reference to its content. Some representations can correctly apply to all and only 
                                                   
4 An anonymous reviewer suggested that there might be representational kinds that possess a classical 
essence. One such candidate kind is “perceptual demonstrative”: there might be an essence (not in the 
sense of a microstructure, as for chemical natural kinds, but in the sense of a sufficient and necessary 
condition) for how perceptual demonstratives have their reference fixed. We are not convinced there is 
such an essence. But even if we were to discover such an essence for the class of perceptual 
demonstratives, it’s unclear to what extent this class would be a representational kind in cognitive 
science (the focus of the chapter), rather than a kind outside the domain of cognitive science (for 
instance, in metasemantics or normative epistemology).   
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actions (i.e. have the content: being an action) without being members of the relevant 
representational kind. For example, imagine someone were to design an artificial 
intelligence with the ability to detect actions, yet whose action-representation 
capacities were based on entirely different computational mechanisms from those 
found in the human mind/brain: for instance, the artificial intelligence might detect 
actions thanks to a lookup table which accessed a huge database with stored templates 
for every single action it ever encountered (Block, 1981).5 In such a case, cognitive 
scientists would not classify the artificial intelligence’s action-recognition capacity as 
belonging to the same representational kind as our own.  
 
We will return to the issue of what – beyond intentional content – unites 
representational kinds. But whatever it is, there is little hope that it will be a classical 
essence. Presumably, there are no interesting necessary and sufficient conditions for 
being an “action-representation” in the sense in which this expression picks out a 
representational kind for cognitive scientists.  
 
Luckily, there are alternatives to the classical account of kinds. Some accounts, such as 
Boyd’s influential homeostatic property cluster (HPC) view (Boyd, 1991), preserve the 
idea that kinds play a privileged epistemic and scientific role without postulating 
essences. Many of our scientific practices tacitly rely on, as well as support, the contrast 
between merely nominal kinds (those for which syndrome-possession constitutes 
membership), and natural ones – even within the special sciences where classical 
essences are plausibly absent.6  
 
According to HPC, natural kinds are the result of an interplay between human 
classificatory interests and mind-independent joints in nature. HPC thus seeks to 
combine a pragmatist conception of kindhood, as partially dependent on human 
practices and concerns, and a realist approach, which captures the traditional intuition 
that natural kinds mark non-accidental and non-conventional divisions in the world.  
 
As in the classical account, HPC kinds are defined by two factors: co-occurring property 
clusters (syndromes) that members tend to instantiate more than non-members; and 
a second factor which accounts for the non-accidentality of resemblance between 
members. By contrast with classical essences, however, property clustering is 
grounded in a collection of “homeostatic mechanisms”. These mechanisms are 
dynamic (they may evolve over time) and context-dependent (they may cause the 
syndrome only in certain “normal” environments, rather than in all circumstances).  
 
                                                   
5 An anonymous reviewer suggests that the brain could use something like lookup-based convolutional 
networks to categorize actions, and that this is not a possibility that we can rule out a priori. We agree 
that if this turns out to be the case, then we would classify the AI’s action-recognition system as 
deploying the same representational kind as our own. In this example we suppose that the look-up table 
AI and the brain do not use the same computations, to make the point that when computations are 
radically different, classificatory practices in cognitive science tend to split the kind.  
6While we’re not discussing in detail how classical and non-classical kinds differ, we mention here some 
of the main dissimilarities: non-classical kinds admit of imperfections in the members of the kind (for 
example Sphynx cats are still cats, even if they don’t have fur), they have fuzzy boundaries between 
categories and admit of overlaps between members of different kinds (such as mules, which are the 
outcome of a cross between a jack and a mare). 
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For Boyd, the relevant notion of “mechanism” is a broad, inclusive one, not to be 
confused with the notion of “mechanism” recently popular elsewhere in philosophy of 
cognitive science (Machamer, Darden, and Craver, 2000). Boydian (non-classical) 
“essences” need not be reducible to more basic interacting entities and their activities. 
Nor do they need to be intrinsic to their members. For instance, Boydian kinds can 
possess historical essences – meaning that property clustering is sustained over time 
by mechanisms of replication or information transfer between members, some of 
which may be external to kind-members. 
 
Though the classical account has its defenders (Devitt, 2008), and is sometimes still 
taken to apply to “microstructural” kinds in the fundamental natural sciences7, non-
classical accounts like Boyd’s are dominant in philosophy of the special sciences. 
Indeed, Boyd’s view, and other similar ones (Millikan, 1999) are designed to allow for 
functional kinds (which are defined in terms of extrinsic causal interactions) to 
potentially count as a subspecies of natural ones, and do not require that kinds 
necessarily figure in law-based explanations. As a result, non-classical views are 
attractive to defenders of broadly functionalist conceptions of the mind (though see 
Ereshefsky and Reydon (2015) for a contrary opinion). In particular, such views are 
compatible with the widespread assumption that psychological kinds are multiply 
realized (Boyd, 1999).8  
 
Henceforth, we will assume that there are representational kinds, and so that some 
version or other of the non-classical account of kindhood will apply to them (for our 
purposes, we will not commit to one specific non-classical account of kinds). However, 
it remains unclear how exactly to apply a non-classical account to representational 
kinds. Although we have contrasted intentional categories, which are merely nominal 
or superficial from the perspective of cognitive science, with genuine representational 
ones, we have yet to explain in any detail what gives representational kinds their 
characteristic “depth”. In the next section, we suggest that the answer to this question 
is to be found by reflecting on the nature of mental representations, and their role in 
vertical, multi-level explanation – which is the paradigmatic form of explanation that 
takes place in cognitive science.  
 
 
4. Representational kinds as multi-level 
 
Merely intentional categories – like the class of wombat-representations – illustrate 
the fact that shared intentional content is not sufficient for representational kindhood 
in cognitive science (even if there might be intentional kinds outside of cognitive 
science, see section 6). Of course, there will be a cluster of other intentional properties 
that tend to be co-instantiated with the property of having a given intentional content. 
For instance, people who possess wombat-representations probably tend to use them 
to make certain inferences, such as moving from the premise “X is a wombat” to the 
conclusion that “X is a mammal” or “X is brown”. But this is a consequence of the 
meaning of “wombat” – or at least of widely shared world-knowledge about wombats. 
                                                   
7 Though see Needham (2002). 
8 The classical account of natural kinds is incompatible with the multiple realizability thesis, because 
psychological kinds are defined not in terms of their internal structure (what they are made of), but in 
terms of their functional properties (what they do). These properties can be implemented in different 
micro-structures and materials.   
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Other sorts of properties of the representational category are hard to derive from its 
content.  Indeed, it is plausible that there are simply no non-intentional properties that 
non-accidentally cluster with the aforementioned intentional ones. 
 
For action-representations, on the other hand, what we can learn about the category is 
not exhausted by its intentional content. Rather, intentional content plays a role akin 
to ostension in the case of physical kinds, like gold: it fixes the reference of the potential 
representational kind and guides the (largely empirical) search for other properties 
which are not obvious consequences of its having the content that it has. 
 
What, then, makes a cluster of representations in cognitive science a kind rather than 
a mere category? Taking the example of action-representations in section 2 to be 
representative, we suggest that talk of “representational kinds” is justified when the co-
clustering of properties is multi-level, that is, when clusters of properties associated 
with the kind are discovered at different levels and are used in vertical, 
decompositional, explanations.  
 
Thus, our master-argument in favor of the multi-levelness of representational kinds 
stems from the role played by natural kinds in scientific endeavors, and from a 
mainstream approach to explanation in cognitive science:   
 
1. Natural kinds play a central role in the epistemic project of scientific 
disciplines: they are used to project properties when making predictions, and 
for explaining systematic observations. 
 
2. The epistemic project of cognitive science is to decompose a complex 
cognitive capacity into simpler components and their relations. This 
decomposition is articulated at multiple levels of explanation, and is iterative: a 
complex cognitive capacity is composed of subsystems that can in turn be 
broken up into further sub-subsystems until no more decomposition is possible. 
 
3. From 1 and 2, the best account of natural representational kinds is one that 
allows them to play a role in these multi-level decompositional explanations, 
with different aspects of representations lining up at different levels of 
explanation.    
 
The picture of the mind suggested by such an approach should be familiar to the 
reader: according to the computational-representational theory of mind, the mind is a 
computational and representational system (Fodor, 1975), which accounts for thinking 
by viewing mental processes as computational processes operating over 
representations, with “formal” or “syntactic” properties lining up with semantic 
properties. At the semantic level, the (logical) thinker moves rationally from premises 
to conclusion in a truth-preserving way. This semantic relation between mental states 
corresponds, at the syntactic level, to a causal transition, ensured by appropriate 
formal relations between thought-vehicles. Token mental representations are thus 
concrete, though potentially spatio-temporally distributed, particulars with a dual 
nature: on the one hand they have intentional, semantic properties; on the other hand, 
they possess non-intentional, non-semantic, vehicular properties.  
 
Mental representations’ vehicular properties include not only syntactic (“formal” 
properties), but also physical properties which correspond to the physical structures 
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that realize (or “implement”) the representations (for humans, neurons and neural 
configurations). We do not wish to endorse any specific approach to CRTM, such as 
the classic approach put forward by Fodor and Pylyshyn: our account is compatible 
with connectionist as well as classical views of computations. What we do endorse is 
the idea that both semantic and vehicular properties of mental representations are in 
the domain of cognitive science, an idea at the core of CRTM (in any form). 
 
In CRTM mental representations are individuated by an appeal to both contents and 
vehicles: classes of representations that are alike with respect to their contents, might 
not be alike with respect to the properties of their vehicles, and thus play different roles 
in processing (Shea, 2007). This is why merely intentional categories do not necessarily 
correspond to representational categories of use in cognitive science.  
 
Understanding how cognitive scientists explore non-observable vehicular properties of 
mental representations throws light on the process by which representational kinds 
are uncovered. Representations’ vehicular properties cannot be discovered a priori, nor 
(usually)9 directly observed. But in many cases they can be inferred from characteristic 
psychological effects. Following Cummins (1983, 2000, 2010), we distinguish between 
psychology’s primary explananda, that is cognitive capacities (such as language 
acquisition or depth perception), which need not be discovered empirically, and 
secondary explananda, that is psychological effects, which have to be discovered 
empirically (for example the effects of the algorithms and representations employed 
for language acquisition or for depth perception). The discovered effects are not the 
endpoints of exploration. Instead, effects need explanations in turn, which appeal to 
constituents of the cognitive systems (including functional and physical components) 
and their organization. 
 
Again drawing on Cummins, we can illustrate the notion of ‘psychological effect’ as 
follows. Multiplications can be performed via two types of mechanisms: the first type 
of mechanism multiplies each digit of one factor by each digit of the other, then adds 
the results; the second mechanism multiplies by repeated addition, and it represents 3 
x 3 as 3 + 3 + 3. The ‘linearity effect’ (i.e. computational cost as a linear function of 
multiplier size) is only shown by the second type of mechanism: for example, 3 x 6 
requires twice as many operations as 3 x 3, and as a result takes twice the time (all 
other things equal).  The linearity effect is characteristic of the particular algorithm 
through which the semantically-specified task of multiplication is accomplished, but it 
is tangential to what the mechanism does. What it shows is something about how the 
mechanism works, and what kind of algorithms and representational vehicles it uses.  
 
Much valuable work in psychology simply demonstrates a certain effect. Ultimately, 
however, psychology appeals to effects not in their own right, but in order to study 
processes and properties of the representations involved in various cognitive 
                                                   
9 An anonymous reviewer casts doubts on this affirmation. On the one hand, they notice that there are 
recent claims that suggest that representations can be directly observed (Thomson & Piccinini, 2018) or 
causally manipulated (Widhalm & Rose, 2019). On the other hand, they doubt that psychological effects 
are directly observed. Regarding the first point, the proposal in this chapter is compatible with 
representations sometimes being observed: if and when they are, this would facilitate the discovery of 
representational kinds. However, direct observation of representations does not seem to be frequent, 
given the present state of our knowledge. Concerning the second point, we’re not arguing that effects are 
directly observed: effects are uncovered through the usual tools of cognitive science (reaction time, 
priming, etc.).  
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capacities. One example is the study of memory capacity limits defined in terms of the 
cost of processing a given number of stimuli. Limits on working memory depend on 
the number of representations to be retained (typically 3 to 5 chunks of stimuli) 
(Cowan, 2010). To return to our previous example, one of the reasons to consider 
“action-representations” a representational kind is precisely that distinctive capacity 
limits can be observed for this category of representations. How many action-
representations can be stored at one time is entirely incidental to the overall semantic 
function of standing for actions. But it puts constraints on the type of vehicles, qua 
vehicles, that can be involved (whether they are stored by the number of objects or by 
the number of features).  
 
Another example are analog magnitude representations, representations of spatial, 
temporal, numerical, and related quantities (Beck, 2015). The main evidence used to 
uncover the analog format of magnitude representations is Weber’s law, according to 
which the ability to discriminate two magnitudes is determined by their ratio (Jordan 
& Brannon, 2006). The closer the magnitudes are in their ratio, the more difficult it is 
to distinguish them until the point (Weber’s constant) where they are not 
discriminable. Again, the presence of this effect shows something about the nature of 
the representations involved and requires moving beyond the semantically-
characterized capacity (in this case the capacity to represent approximate quantities).  
 
The strategy of decomposing complex capacities into their components, which are then 
investigated, points toward a central feature of explanations in cognitive science: they 
are vertical rather than horizontal explanations (Drayson, 2012). The difference 
between the two kinds of explanations is that horizontal explanations explain an 
event’s occurrence by referring to a sequence of events that precede it, while vertical 
explanations explain a phenomenon synchronically by referring to its components and 
their relations. Folk psychological explanations are horizontal, because they appeal to 
sequences of mental events that precede the behavior to be explained. Cognitive 
psychological explanations are vertical, because a complex capacity is decomposed in 
simpler components, via functional analysis (Cummins, 1975). This does not mean that 
there are no valuable horizontal explanations of behavior using belief-desire 
psychology (or more sophisticated elaborations on the belief-desire model, such as one 
finds in certain areas of social psychology, for example). However, not all explanatorily 
useful psychological categories are representational kinds. Talk of “representational 
kinds” occurs and is justified only when explanation takes place vertically, and 
projection of properties of representations (at least potentially) crosses explanatory 
levels.10 
 
What is the relevant notion of levels in multi-level explanations? There are many 
accounts of levels (e.g., Dennett, 1978; Marr, 1982; Pylyshyn, 1984), with Marr’s being 
the most influential. According to Marr, we can study a cognitive system at three levels 
(and a “complete explanation” of a cognitive phenomenon spans all three):  
 
                                                   
10 An example is provided by the literature on object perception and cognition (Carey & Xu, 2001; Scholl, 
2001), which led to the postulation of the representational kind ‘object files’. Similar effects were 
observed both in adults and in infants, such as similar set-size capacity limits, or similar prioritization 
of spatio-temporal over featural information, leading to adults’ and infants’ object representations being 
“lumped” together into a common kind. Carey & Xu argue that “[y]oung infants' object representations 
are the same natural kind as the object files of mid-level vision [in adults]” (Carey and Xu, 2001, p. 210). 
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1. At the computational level, the task of the system is identified and 
redescribed in terms of the information-processing problem that the system has 
to solve, and the constraints that the system has to satisfy to perform this task 
are identified (this level is concerned with what the system does and why it does 
it). 
2. At the algorithmic-representational level the transformation rules 
(algorithms) and the syntactic properties of the representations that accomplish 
the task identified at level 1 are specified (including the format of the 
representations that are the inputs, the intermediaries, and the outputs of the 
processes).  
3. At the implementational level the physical structures (neural mechanisms) 
that realize the processes described at level 2 and the neural localization are 
specified.  
 
Marr’s account of levels has been challenged: for example, it has been argued that these 
are not special levels of explanation, but merely heuristic clusters of questions 
(McClamrock, 1991), that there are intermediate levels between the computational and 
the algorithmic levels (Griffiths, Lieder, & Goodman, 2015), or that the 
implementational level is not as autonomous as the original account made it out to be 
(Kaplan, 2017). There is also a debate about what exactly Marr’s levels are: are they 
levels of abstraction, levels of organization, levels of analysis, or levels of realization 
(Craver, 2014)?  
 
An exhaustive overview of Marr’s levels and their different interpretations is a topic for 
another paper (or book). Here we endorse the view that these are levels of explanation, 
and that they are identified by the type of questions cognitive scientists might ask in 
their investigation. We side with the view that Marr’s computational level is specified 
with reference to intentional representational contents (which makes it similar to 
Pylyshyn’s semantic level).11 On the other hand, we do not assume that there are only 
three levels: our account is open to the inclusion of further levels in addition to the 
ones above.  
 
What matters to our purpose is the close relation between levels and kinds. In many 
domains, it is fruitful to study cognitive systems as multi-level when trying to uncover 
whether they are natural kinds. For example, this is the strategy used by Michaelian 
(2011) for exploring whether memory is a natural kind. For memory systems this 
implies asking three questions: 
  
a) is there an information-processing task common to the relevant memory 
 systems? (computational level)  
 
b) is there a procedure for performing that task common to the systems?  
 (algorithmic-representational level)  
 
c) is there an implementation of the procedure common to the systems?  
 (implementational level)  
 
                                                   
11 In the debate on whether Marr’s computational level refers to representations and their contents, or 
to a mathematically specified function (Shagrir, 2010). 
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A lack of unity at each of the levels, and an impossibility of projecting across levels, 
implies that the memory system is not a cognitive natural kind (if Michaelian is right). 
Though this example concerns a cognitive system, it highlights an important feature of 
inquiry in cognitive science more generally: natural kinds in cognitive science are 
plausibly necessarily multi-level. Similarly, for representational kinds, clusters of non-
accidentally co-occurring properties need to be discovered at multiple levels in order 
for there to be kindhood.  
 
As previously mentioned, representations have a content and a vehicle with syntactic 
and physical properties. These properties of representations entail that they can be 
studied at different levels. The alignment between properties of representations and 
levels might not be perfect, but it provides a heuristic for the discovery of 
representational kinds. At the computational level we’re interested in finding out what 
the representations represent, and how their contents are connected with other mental 
states and with behaviors. For example, at the computational level the action detection 
system’s aim is to detect actions in the environment. At the algorithmic-
representational level, scientists discover the features of the processes that the 
representations enter into, as well as some properties of the vehicles, such as their 
format. Here, for example, scientists bring to light the processes implicated in the 
differentiation between actions and non-animated movements, as well as the format 
of action representations. At the implementational level, scientists look for the features 
of the neural structures underlying action-representations, as well as for their 
localization in the brain.  
 
Our claim is that for a representational category to constitute a kind, it must allow for 
cross-level projection of properties. This strongly suggests that the representations 
correspond to a joint in (cognitive) nature: they have more in common than mere 
content, and further resemblance between them is unlikely to be accidental.  To return 
to the example we used earlier, the semantic syndrome of action-representations 
provides a first step in the positing of a potential representational kind: there is 
evidence for domain-specific detection of stimuli that involve visible movements. But 
action-representations also show effects that are due to non-semantic properties of the 
representations involved, which we reviewed in section 1. 
 
At this point one could object (as one anonymous reviewer does) that there is no real 
contrast between wombat-representations and action-representations, because one 
can always find a cluster of properties at different levels, even for wombat-
representations. As a result, our account over-generates. This objection can be 
formulated in two ways. In the first version of the objection, when I deploy a wombat-
representation, there are some activations in my brain, as well as some psychological 
processes (such as categorization) that occur at the same time. For example, I can 
imagine a picture of a wombat and I can think “wombats are cute”. In both of these 
cases we can find syntactic and implementational properties. Why not say that they 
cluster together to form the (generic) kind “wombat-representation”?  
 
We contend that in this case the features would be too heterogeneous for natural 
kindhood: very few shared features would be found at the algorithmic-representational 
and implementational levels. Indeed, such a proposal would be subject to the same 
arguments Machery uses against prototypes, exemplars, and theories belonging to the 
same natural representational kind “concept” (Machery, 2009). 
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In the second version of the objection, the focus is only on wombat-representations 
that are prototypes (a similar argument could be formulated for exemplars or theories). 
In this case, there are certainly properties that cluster together at the algorithmic-
representational and implementational levels. Yet, in this case the properties 
associated with wombat-prototypes are also shared with other “basic level categories” 
(basic for thinkers familiar with the Australian fauna), such as kiwi-prototypes, 
kangaroo-prototypes, and so on. The representational kind here is not wombat-
representation, but “prototype category-representation”, of which wombat-prototypes 
are a sub-category, similarly to how Dalmatian, Pomeranian and Chow Chow are all 
different breeds of the same kind “dog”.  
 
By contrast, action-representations show a significant clustering of properties at 
different levels: intentional properties at the semantic level, special format and effects 
at the syntactic level, and characteristic patterns of brain activations at the 
implementational level. Moreover, this cluster of features is also distinct from other 
representations in the vicinity, such as representations of non-action movements, 
including random spatio-temporal trajectories (see Smortchkova, 2018).    
 
Thus, contrary to wombat-representations, action-representations in cognitive science 
are good candidates for kindhood. They exhibit commonalities which allow them to be 
identified at various levels of inquiry. They form a kind not merely on the basis of their 
intentional content, but on the basis of the discovery of psychological effects and 
physical-implementational properties, which provide evidence of multi-level 
resemblance between representations of the relevant sort – in other words, they exhibit 
the relevant sort of “depth” which justifies talk of “kinds”, despite the absence of a 
classical essence.  
 
 
5. How many levels of explanation are needed? 
 
A strong version of the multi-level thesis would require non-accidental clustering of 
properties across all levels, i.e. that the kinds go “all the way down” to the 
implementational level. One reason to endorse such a view would be if one conceived 
of the algorithmic-representational level as a mere “sketch” of what is going on at the 
implementational level, and insisted that functional constituents of a system have to 
line up with spatiotemporal ones (Piccinini & Craver, 2011). In this section we would 
like to explore how some representational kinds could be unified at some (more than 
one) levels without being necessarily unified at all levels.  
 
The first way in which not all levels might be needed is tied to the standard version of 
the multiple realization thesis (Putnam, 1967): a kind that is unified at the 
computational and algorithmic-representational levels might not be unified at the 
implementational level.  The most obvious reason to reject the all-level version of the 
multi-level thesis is thus to allow for representational kinds to be genuinely 
psychological, as opposed to necessarily neuropsychological, i.e. multiply realized at 
the implementational level.  
 
A second way in which a representational kind could be multi-level without 
encompassing all levels would be for the kind to exhibit what we could call “inverse 
multiple-realizability”: a category of vehicles is inversely multiply realized if it forms a 
kind at the algorithmic-representational and implementational levels, yet has multiple 
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different types of contents. Such a kind would be unified at the algorithmic-
representational level, as well as in terms of the implementational mechanisms that 
realize the relevant algorithmic function; yet at the computational level, there would 
be few or no semantic properties in common between its members. There is clearly 
room in logical – and indeed empirical space for such a kind. 
 
One potential example is “address addressable representations” and “content 
addressable representations” used in information processing approaches inspired by 
computer science (Bechtel & Abrahamsen, 2002; Gallistel & King, 2011). “Address-
addressable representations” are used to retrieve mnemonic contents stored at 
different locations (addresses) via indexes that (non-semantically) identify the 
addresses. “Content-addressable representations” search for storage locations in 
memory by probing them with partial contents, that are used to retrieve the rest of the 
stored information. When applied to explanations of human cognition, these 
representations would acquire their kindhood status if properties that enabled the 
brain to realize these particular sorts of computational operations were discovered at 
the implementational level. What would be stored at the various memory addresses 
would, by hypothesis, be representations, endowed with content. However, there 
might be nothing in common to the different contents of the representations within the 
(broad) class of “address-addressable memory representations”. By analogy with 
typical examples of multiple realizations, we would find the address-addressable 
representations to have a fairly open-ended disjunction of semantic properties – 
though what enables them to all be addressable in the same way might be empirically 
discovered to be some similar brain mechanism.  For such a kind, semantic content, 
though present, is merely “quantified over” rather than made reference to – it does not 
play a role in unifying the kind. If one adopts an approach to the brain strongly driven 
by concepts from computational theory, à la Gallistel and King, one should expect – 
indeed hope – to find such kinds.  
 
It is also worth noting that representational kinds are sometimes identified at the 
computational and implementational levels without reference to the intermediary 
algorithmic-representational level. This seems to be an approach that is commonly 
used in some areas of neuroscience to find representational kinds. When studying how 
the brain represents types of objects, the methodology is often based on differential 
activation of brain regions: for example, regions in the face fusiform area (FFA) are 
said to represent faces because they are active when face stimuli are present, and not 
when other kinds of stimuli are present, such as tools (Grill-Spector, 2003). Prima facie 
this practice suggests that kinds could be identified on the basis of content and 
implementation alone, with little or no regard for “syntax”. 
 
One could object that, in such cases, the gap at the algorithmic-representational level 
is only epistemic – it reflects temporary ignorance, or division of labor between 
neuroscientists and psychologists, rather than the true nature of the kind. According 
to such a view, in reality, face-representations will be known to constitute a 
representational kind only when cognitive scientists also discover shared algorithms 
underlying face perception, and other syntactic properties of face-representations.   
 
However, there is a stronger thesis that would suggest that we can bypass the 
algorithmic-representational level altogether and identify representational kinds via 
their semantic content and their implementational features only: such a thesis might 
be taken to follow from a version of the semantic view of computation in cognitive 
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science recently defended by Rescorla (2017). According to Rescorla’s view 
computation individuation proceeds via semantic properties along with non-
representational implementational mechanisms (p. 302) without any contribution 
from formal syntactic properties. Thus, Rescorla writes that “[w]e can model the mind 
computationally without postulating formal mental syntax” (p. 281). 
 
Views about computation individuation do not necessarily apply to accounts of 
computational explanation and the claim that we should do without mental syntax 
altogether is obviously highly controversial. Therefore, Rescorla’s view may or may not 
be true of computational explanation in cognitive science in general. But the view 
certainly does not seem downright contradictory. As a result, it strikes us as at least 
coherent to suppose that some explanations could in principle take place only at the 
computational and implementational levels. If that is the case, it would behoove us to 
make room for multi-level kinds that span levels 1 and 3 of the tri-level approach: if 
there is no need for level 2, then level 2 properties are not required for kindhood. While 
we do not wish to endorse Rescorla’s view, the important point for our purposes is that 
it is compatible with ours: it leaves the room for some multi-level representational 
kinds that do not span all levels.   
  
Finally, we do not claim that one of the levels is more basic, in the sense of having to 
play the role of the sustaining mechanism for the syndrome of properties at other 
levels. For example, we are not claiming that the implementational level or the 
algorithmic-representational level is where one finds the mechanism sustaining the 
clustering of semantic properties at the computational level. Indeed, the sustaining 
mechanisms might be extrinsic to the representational kind. The most obvious 
argument for such a view derives from (meta)semantic externalism, the view 
according to which what determines the content of a mental representation are causal-
historical relations to one’s environment or community (Deutsch & Lau, 2014). For 
instance, according to teleosemantic approaches to intentional content, the 
mechanism which determines the content of mental representations is at least partly 
historical (Millikan, 1984). Our multi-level view of representational kindhood is 
entirely compatible with externalism about content.  
 
What matters for representational kindhood is the existence of robust clustering of 
properties and cross-level projections, which enable the representational kind to 
support many generalizations and predictions. Such multi-levelness is sufficient, in our 
view, to support the claim that the clustering is non-accidental. The multi-level thesis 
for kindhood need not include the claim that one of the lower levels is the sustaining 
mechanism for the cluster of properties that are exhibited by the kind. Even if research 
is guided by the tacit assumption that there is some sustaining mechanism for the kind, 
such a mechanism might be extrinsic.  
 
There might also be a plurality of mechanisms. This plurality might be synchronic: for 
instance, if a two-factor view of content determination were correct (Block, 1986) the 
semantic level would be partially sustained by internal causes/functional role, and 
partially by external environmental causes. Note that not all aspects of functional role 
have to be equally content-determining: incidental effects may be incidental also in the 
sense of being metasemantically inert. A plurality of cluster-sustaining mechanisms 
may also be involved diachronically: it is compatible with Boyd’s view that different 
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mechanisms play the role at different times, or on different time-scales (e.g. 
ontogenetically and phylogenetically). 12   
 
 
6. Objections and replies 
 
In this section we consider some objections to our account, and offer replies that we 
hope will help clarify the proposal.  
 
Objection 1: Some representational kinds in cognitive science are single level. For 
instance, some are purely semantic (e.g. singular thought, belief), or purely based on 
format or syntax (e.g. analog representations, or address-addressable memory 
representations). 
 
Reply: Our reply to this objection is that, in reality, single-level kinds fall into two cases: 
either they are not kinds in cognitive science, or they are (secretly) multi-level.  
 
To illustrate the first case, take “singular thought” as an example: to the extent that it 
is a merely semantic (or merely epistemological) kind, identified by a clustering of 
semantic or epistemic properties, it is not relevant to cognitive science. It becomes a 
candidate representational kind from a cognitive scientific perspective when one 
engages in the project of vertical explanation by looking at properties at other levels 
whose existence could support kindhood (Murez, Smortchkova, & Strickland, 
forthcoming).  
 
To clarify our view on this point, it is worth stressing that we do not deny that some 
categories of entities may constitute kinds merely by virtue of sharing semantic 
properties. For instance, formal semanticists debate whether adverbs or quantifiers 
form natural kinds (see Balcerak Jackson, 2017, who defends an account of semantic 
kinds inspired by Evans, 1985). But these are, precisely, candidate semantic kinds, 
which are studied by linguists, not mental representational ones studied by cognitive 
scientists. The latter are those that are the primary targets of investigation in cognitive 
science, the science which studies mental representations.  
 
What about solely format-based kinds? “Analog” picks out a candidate 
representational kind only to the extent that analog representations share interesting 
properties at other levels, in addition to their being analog. For example, analog 
representations play a role both in number cognition (Dehaene, 1997) and in mental 
modeling (Johnson-Laird, 2006) where they pick out entities in different domains. 
These different roles and domain-specificities might come with different properties at 
the computational and implementational levels, which might lead to the postulation of 
different representational kinds with analog format.  
 
This brings us to the second reply to the objection. Many purportedly single level kinds 
might actually turn out to be multi-level, if one adopts a more accurate view of levels. 
Indeed, various philosophers and cognitive scientists have argued that the usual 
tripartition between levels is insufficiently fine-grained. For example, there might be 
levels between the computational and the algorithmic (Griffiths et al., 2015; Peacocke, 
1986). Likewise, the semantic level might usefully divide into semantic (what is the 
                                                   
12 We hope to further explore the question about the sustaining mechanism in future work. 
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content?) and metasemantic (what determines or grounds the content?) levels 
(Burgess & Sherman 2014). In some cases, the appearance of a single-level kind could 
be explained by an insufficiently fine-grained account of what constitutes a level. A 
kind could span multiple sub-levels, thereby acquiring the requisite sort of “depth”.  
 
 
Objection 2: Our proposal goes against the independence of the levels and multiple 
realizability. 
 
Reply: The notion of “kindhood” we use relates kindhood to explanation in cognitive 
science. Our view is entirely compatible with a methodological or merely epistemic 
independence of levels: it might be useful, for various epistemic or methodological 
purposes, to abstract away from other levels in studying a representational kind, for 
example when the implementation is unknown, or when the algorithms haven’t been 
yet discovered. Furthermore, as we made clear, we are not committed to the claim that 
kinds go “all the way down” (i.e. to a “tri-level” view of representational kinds). 
Nevertheless, to talk of “kinds” is to commit to there being more to the representations 
being studied than what is found at a single level. The view is compatible with 
representational kinds being multiply realizable: all it requires is that there be clusters 
of properties at different levels and inter-level constraints (a requirement commonly 
accepted in multi-level explanations).  
 
Objection 3: Levels are not the only source of “inductive depth”, history (evolutionary 
history) also plays a role. For example, Ereshefsky (2007) suggests that we should 
study psychological categories as homologies, and not only as functions or as 
adaptations. 
 
Reply: We agree with this. As we noted, there are different possible views of the 
sustaining mechanism, that is the factor that unifies a kind and that causes the 
properties in the kind-syndrome to non-accidentally cluster together: intrinsic (e.g. a 
common neural mechanism) or extrinsic (e.g. a common developmental or 
evolutionary history). A representational kind might correspond to a grouping of 
representations that share properties in virtue of a common evolutionary ancestor, for 
example. This assumption is often implicit in cognitive science and guides research. 
Indeed, the discovery of essentialist representations in the cognition of adults and 
infants (Gelman, 2004) guides the search for the same representational kind in apes 
(Cacchione, Hrubesch, Call, & Rakoczy, 2016).  
 
What is the role of historical factors for representational kinds? According to one view, 
some representational kinds are unified by extrinsic, historical factors. We could talk 
of such representational kinds having a “historical sustaining mechanism”. Another 
possible option is that historical properties can be counted among those that non-
accidentally cluster together to form a kind, without necessarily being the mechanism 
that causes the clustering. Yet another option would be that, if levels of explanation in 
cognitive science are properly understood, they would make room for a historical or 
evolutionary level. Our view of representational kinds is compatible with these 
different options for the role of history, which might each be true of different 
representational kinds. 
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Objection 4. What distinguishes representational kinds from other cognitive kinds? 
For instance, what distinguishes representational kinds from kinds of mental 
processes?  
 
Reply: This issue intersects with the more general issue “What is a mental 
representation?”. We will not attempt a general definition. We assume that 
representations have semantic properties, but also non-semantic ones. The semantic 
properties are “substantial” to the extent that e.g. the distinction between 
representational correctness and error plays a not easily eliminated explanatory role. 
A kind is not representational if it makes no reference to semantic properties. For 
instance, a classification of brain states according to merely physiological criteria 
might count as a cognitive scientific kind, but not as a representational one.  
 
Any functional kind will allow for some sort of multi-level approach: one can 
distinguish role-level investigation, and realizers/implementational level. However, 
the division into levels introduced by Marr in the context of a computational theory of 
vision are (arguably) specific to – or at least paradigmatic of – representational 
explanation. Hence, it might be suggested that the sort of multi-level approach we 
describe is indeed specific to representational kinds, as opposed to other sorts of 
cognitive kinds. 
 
Objection 5: Can’t representational kinds be unified/individuated merely by the sorts 
of processes that operate on those representations? For instance, suppose you have an 
independent notion of what makes a process perceptual, as opposed to cognitive. Might 
one not then introduce a kind “perceptual representations” that would not satisfy our 
criteria?  
 
Reply: Representations play a role within processes, including computational-
inferential processes, and perhaps non-computational and non-inferential processes 
(such as, arguably, associations)13. In general, there is a close connection between 
representations and processes. In such cases, a kind of representation is picked out by 
reference to a kind of process (or to a component of cognitive architecture). Yet, kinds 
of processes and kinds of representations can be orthogonal. In some cases, 
classification of representations into kinds crosscuts processing, for instance when one 
entertains the possibility that visual imagery manipulates the same representations as 
visual perception. In other cases, the same process might make use of different kinds 
of representations, for example if perceptual processes use both iconic and discursive 
representations (Quilty-Dunn, forthcoming).  
 
According to our requirement of depth, for there to be a genuinely representational 
kind, there must be more in common to the representations in question than merely 
that they are processed in the same way. For instance, “visual representation” might 
pick out a representational kind if it turns out that such representations tend (non 
accidentally) to share format-properties (e.g. they tend to be iconic) and effects at 
deeper levels. On this view, while “visual representation” may pick out a useful class of 
                                                   
13 An anonymous reviewer challenges this claim by remarking that associations can be computational if 
they occur in artificial neural networks, and that their non-inferential status depends on the notion of 
inference one endorses. Here we accept the standard contrast between associative transitions and 
computational transitions in the computational theory of mind. See Mandelbaum (2015) for a review of 
the contrast.  
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representations, it only picks out a genuinely representational kind if the 
representations non-accidentally share properties at multiple levels. 
 
The fact that representations participate in processes and are partially identified by the 
role they play in these doesn’t undermine the existence of representational kinds, just 
like the fact that, in the biological domain, mitochondria participate in the process of 
cellular respiration doesn’t diminish their status as a potential natural kind. 
 
A related objection (due to an anonymous reviewer) states that appealing to processes 
in the identification of representational kinds runs the risk of over-generating. All 
representations that can be stored in a limited working memory would be of the same 
kind (“working memory representations”). This suggests that the properties that make 
representational categories kinds, are not properties of representations, but properties 
of the system that processes representations. If we could explain all features of 
representations by the type of processes to which they belong, then we wouldn’t have 
representational kinds, but only process kinds. Our reply above also applies to this 
objection: Storage in working memory is only one of the features of a genuine 
representational kind.  
 
 
Objection 6. Semantic content of the sort that matters to cognitive science is 
internalistic, and determined by syntax. Externalistic intentional content is largely 
irrelevant. What you call a “semantic syndrome” plays no role in representational 
kinds’ individuation.  
 
Reply: This objection appeals to an internalist account of mental representations that 
has been proposed (among others) by Egan (2013), who distinguishes representations 
with “mathematical content” from representations with cognitive content (content that 
refers to the environment). Representations with mathematical content are 
characterized functionally by the role they play in the computational account of a 
cognitive capacity. This role is specified in mathematical terms and does not make 
reference to worldly entities. Yet mathematical representations are representational 
because they can misrepresent, relative to the ‘success criteria’ of the cognitive capacity 
that has to be explained. Egan uses as an example Marr’s description of the stage of 
early visual processing which takes light intensity values at different parts of the image 
as inputs and gives as outputs calculations of the change rate of the intensities in the 
image. This representation could be applied to an environment where light behaves 
very differently from ours (Egan, 2013, p. 122).  
 
Regardless of whether Egan’s account of “mathematical content” is correct, Egan’s 
representational kinds are, in fact, multi-level in our sense, because in order for the 
mathematical description of the capacity to explain cognition, it has to be mapped onto 
the physical realizer via a realization function, such that transitions in the physical 
system mirror transitions between symbols in the mathematical computation (Egan, 
1992).  
 
Furthermore, though we are sympathetic to the claim that Egan’s account applies to 
some representational kinds (but see Sprevak (2010) for a critical discussion), it strikes 
us as implausible that it will extend to all representational kinds studied in cognitive 
science. Action-representations are first identified by their worldly extension, and the 
fact that they refer to actions plays a central role in the study of this representational 
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kind. For many representational kinds, an externalist account of content (Burge, 1979) 
seems to be more adequate.  
 
7. Conclusion: the notion of maximal representational kind.  
 
To conclude, we would like to suggest that cognitive scientists operate with a (tacit) 
ideal of what a representational kind looks like – a maximal representational kind. A 
maximal representational kind is a category of representations that are maximally 
“deep”, in that they non-accidentally share properties across all levels of description. 
Representational kindhood can come in degrees, to the extent that an actual class of 
representations can match more or less closely to this ideal of a maximal kind. We 
think that the notion of a maximal kind can be viewed as a heuristic device that guides 
research in cognitive science: to hypothesize that a certain class of representations 
forms a kind is to be disposed to investigate other properties that co-cluster with those 
that have been used to initially pick out members of the kind in the process of vertically 
decomposing the capacity to be explained. 
 
There are still many details to fill in to fully develop an account of representational 
kinds. In this chapter we have sketched the main outline of a proposal that we hope to 
expand and refine in the future.  
 
Acknowledgements  
 
We are grateful to audiences in Bochum, London, Nottingham, and Oxford for 
insightful comments on previous versions of the chapter. In particular, we thank the 
participants of the Philosophy of Mind Work in Progress group in Oxford (Umut 
Baysan, Dominic Alford-Duguid, Sam Clarke, Anil Gomes, Jake Quilty-Dunn, Nick 
Shea, and Margot Strohminger) for helpful discussion of a previous version of this 
paper, two anonymous reviewers for insightful comments, and Krys Dolega for a last 
round of comments. Joulia Smortchkova’s work on this chapter has received funding 
from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 
2020 research and innovation programme grant agreement No. 681422. 
 
References 
 
Atran, S. (2002). In Gods We Trust: The Evolutionary Landscape of Religion: Oxford 
University Press. 
Bechtel, W., & Abrahamsen, A. (2002). Connectionism and the mind: Parallel 
processing, dynamics, and evolution in networks: Blackwell Publishing. 
Beck, J. (2015). Analog Magnitude Representations: A Philosophical Introduction. 
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 66(4), 829-855.  
Block, N. (1981). Psychologism and behaviorism. Philosophical Review, 90(1), 5-43.  
Block, N. (1986). Advertisement for a semantics for psychology. Midwest Studies in 
Philosophy, 10(1), 615-678.  
Boyd, R. (1991). Realism, Anti-Foundationalism and the Enthusiasm for Natural 
Kinds. Philosophical Studies, 61(1), 127-148.  
Boyd, R. (1999). Kinds, Complexity and Multiple realization. Philosophical Studies, 
95(1), 67-98.  
Burge, T. (1979). Individualism and the mental. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 4(1), 
73-122.  
21 
 
Cacchione, T., Hrubesch, C., Call, J., & Rakoczy, H. (2016). Are apes essentialists? 
Scope and limits of psychological essentialism in great apes. Animal cognition, 
19(5), 921-937.  
Carey, S. (2009). The Origin of Concepts: Oxford University Press. 
Carey, S., & Xu, F. (2001). Infants' knowledge of objects: Beyond object files and object 
tracking. Cognition, 80(1-2), 179-213.  
Cowan, N. (2010). The magical mystery four: How is working memory capacity limited, 
and why? Current directions in psychological science, 19(1), 51-57.  
Craver, C. F. (2014). Levels: Open MIND. Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. 
Cummins, R. C. (1975). Functional analysis. Journal of Philosophy, 72(November), 
741-764.  
Cummins, R. C. (1983). The Nature of Psychological Explanation (Vol. 19): MIT Press. 
Cummins, R. C. (2000). "How does it work" versus "what are the laws?": Two 
conceptions of psychological explanation. In F. Keil & R. A. Wilson (Eds.), 
Explanation and Cognition, 117-145: MIT Press. 
Cummins, R. C. (2010). The World in the Head: Oxford University Press. 
Dehaene, S. (1997). The number sense. New York Oxford University Press. 
Dennett, D. C. (1978). Brainstorms: MIT Press. 
Dennett, D. C. (1994). Get Real. Philosophical Topics, 22(1/2), 505-568.  
Deutsch, M., & Lau, J. (2014). Externalism about Mental Content. The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosopshy.  
Devitt, M. (2008). Resurrecting biological essentialism. Philosophy of Science, 75(3), 
344-382.  
Drayson, Z. (2012). The uses and abuses of the personal/subpersonal distinction. 
Philosophical Perspectives, 26(1), 1-18.  
Dupre, J. (1981). Natural Kinds and Biological Taxa. The Philosophical Review, 90(1), 
66-90.  
Egan, F. (2013). How to think about mental content. Philosophical Studies(1), 1-21.  
Ereshefsky, M. (2007). Psychological categories as homologies: lessons from ethology. 
Biology and Philosophy, 22(5), 659-674.  
Ereshefsky, M., & Reydon, T. A. C. (2015). Scientific kinds. Philosophical Studies, 
172(4), 969-986.  
Fodor, J. A. (1974). Special sciences. Synthese, 28(2), 97-115.  
Fodor, J. A. (1975). The Language of Thought (Vol. 87): Harvard University Press. 
Gallese, V., Fadiga, L., Fogassi, L., & Rizzolatti, G. (2002). 17 Action representation and 
the inferior parietal lobule.  
Gallistel, C. R., & King, A. P. (2011). Memory and the computational brain: Why 
cognitive science will transform neuroscience (Vol. 6): John Wiley & Sons. 
Gelman, S. (2004). Psychological essentialism in children. Trends in Cognitive 
Sciences, 8(9), 404-409.  
Griffiths, T. L., Lieder, F., & Goodman, N. D. (2015). Rational use of cognitive 
resources: Levels of analysis between the computational and the algorithmic. 
Topics in cognitive science, 7(2), 217-229.  
Grill-Spector, K. (2003). The neural basis of object perception. Current opinion in 
neurobiology, 13(2), 159-166.  
Jackson, F., & Pettit, P. (1990). In defense of folk psychology. Philosophical Studies, 
59(1), 31-54.  
Jellema, T., & Perrett, D. I. (2007). Neural pathways of social cognition. Dunbar and 
Barrett, Oxford Handbook, 163-177.  
Johnson-Laird, P. N. (2006). How we reason: Oxford University Press, USA. 
22 
 
Jordan, K. E., & Brannon, E. M. (2006). A common representational system governed 
by Weber’s law: Nonverbal numerical similarity judgments in 6-year-olds and 
rhesus macaques. Journal of experimental child psychology, 95(3), 215-229.  
Kaplan, D. M. (2017). Integrating Mind and Brain Science: A Field Guide: Oxford 
University Press. 
Khalidi, M. A. (2016). Innateness as a natural cognitive kind. Philosophical 
Psychology, 29(3), 319-333.  
Kripke, S. (1980). Naming and Necessity (Vol. 217): Harvard University Press. 
Lafraire, J., Rioux, C., Giboreau, A., & Picard, D. (2016). Food rejections in children: 
Cognitive and social/environmental factors involved in food neophobia and 
picky/fussy eating behavior. Appetite, 96, 347-357.  
Lycan, W. G. (1988). Judgement and Justification (Vol. 100): Cambridge University 
Press. 
Machamer, P., Darden, L., & Craver, C. F. (2000). Thinking about mechanisms. 
Philosophy of Science, 67(1), 1-25.  
Machery, E. (2009). Doing Without Concepts: Oxford University Press. 
Mandelbaum, E. (2015). Associationist Theories of Thought Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy. 
Marr, D. (1982). Vision: A computational investigation into: WH Freeman. 
McClamrock, R. (1991). Marr's three levels: A re-evaluation. Minds and Machines, 
1(2), 185-196.  
Michaelian, K. (2011). Is memory a natural kind? Memory Studies, 4(2), 170-189.  
Millikan, R. G. (1984). Language, thought, and other biological categories: New 
foundations for realism: MIT press. 
Millikan, R. G. (1999). Historical kinds and the "special sciences". Philosophical 
Studies, 95(1-2), 45-65.  
Murez, M., Smortchkova, J., & Strickland, B. (forthcoming). The Mental Files Theory 
of Singular Thought: A Psychological Perspective. In R. Goodman, J. Genone, & 
N. Kroll (Eds.), Mental Files and Singular Thought. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Needham, P. (2002). The discovery that water is H2O. International Studies in the 
Philosophy of Science, 16(3), 205 – 226.  
Peacocke, C. (1986). Explanation in computational psychology: Language, perception 
and level. Mind and Language, 1(2), 101-123.  
Piccinini, G., & Craver, C. (2011). Integrating psychology and neuroscience: functional 
analyses as mechanism sketches. Synthese, 183(3), 283-311.  
Putnam, H. (1975). The meaning of 'meaning'. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of 
Science, 7, 131-193.  
Putnam, H. (1967). Psychological predicates. Art, mind, and religion, 1, 37-48.  
Pylyshyn, Z. W. (1984). Computation and cognition: MIT press Cambridge, MA. 
Quilty-Dunn, J. (forthcoming). Perceptual Pluralism. Noûs.  
Quine, W. V. (1969). Ontological Relativity and Other Essays: Columbia University 
Press. 
Ramsey, W. M. (2007). Representation reconsidered: Cambridge University Press. 
Rescorla, M. (2017). From Ockham to Turing–and Back Again Philosophical 
Explorations of the Legacy of Alan Turing (pp. 279-304): Springer. 
Rizzolatti, G., & Sinigaglia, C. (2007). Mirror neurons and motor intentionality. 
Functional neurology, 22(4), 205.  
Scholl, B. J. (2001). Objects and attention: The state of the art. Cognition, 80(1-2), 1-
46.  
23 
 
Shagrir, O. (2010). Marr on computational-level theories. Philosophy of Science, 77(4), 
477-500.  
Shea, N. (2007). Content and Its vehicles in connectionist systems. Mind and 
Language, 22(3), 246–269.  
Shea, N. (2018). Representation in cognitive science: Oxford University Press. 
Shiffrar, M. (2008). Embodied motion perception: Psychophysical studies of the 
factors defining visual sensitivity to self-and other-generated actions. 
Embodiment, ego-space, and action, 113-143.  
Shutts, K., Condry, K. F., Santos, L. R., & Spelke, E. S. (2009). Core knowledge and its 
limits: The domain of food. Cognition, 112(1), 120-140.  
Smortchkova, J. (2018). Seeing goal-directedness: a case for social perception. The 
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.  
Sprevak, M. (2010). Computation, individuation, and the received view on 
representation. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 41(3), 
260-270.  
Thomson, E., & Piccinini, G. (2018). Neural Representations Observed. Minds and 
Machines, 28(1), 191-235.  
Widhalm, M. L., & Rose, N. S. (2019). How can transcranial magnetic stimulation be 
used to causally manipulate memory representations in the human brain? 
Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science, 10(1), e1469.  
Wood, J. N. (2007). Visual working memory for observed actions. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: General, 136(4), 639.  
 
 
 
